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Recent research has slowly corroded a belief that selective attention and consciousness are 
so tightly entangled that they cannot be individually examined. In this review, we summarize 
psychophysical and neurophysiological evidence for a dissociation between top-down attention 
and consciousness. The evidence includes recent findings that show subjects can attend 
to perceptually invisible objects. More contentious is the finding that subjects can become 
conscious of an isolated object, or the gist of the scene in the near absence of top-down 
attention; we critically re-examine the possibility of “complete” absence of top-down attention. 
We also cover the recent flurry of studies that utilized independent manipulation of attention 
and consciousness. These studies have shown paradoxical effects of attention, including 
examples where top-down attention and consciousness have opposing effects, leading us to 
strengthen and revise our previous views. Neuroimaging studies with EEG, MEG, and fMRI 
are uncovering the distinct neuronal correlates of selective attention and consciousness in 
dissociative paradigms. These findings point to a functional dissociation: attention as analyzer 
and consciousness as synthesizer. Separating the effects of selective visual attention from 
those of visual consciousness is of paramount importance to untangle the neural substrates 
of consciousness from those for attention.
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posit that these two processes are inextricably entangled, if not 
identical (Posner, 1994; Jackendoff, 1996; Velmans, 1996; Merikle 
and Joordens, 1997; Mack and Rock, 1998; Chun and Wolfe, 2000; 
O’Regan and Noe, 2001; Mole, 2008; De Brigard and Prinz, 2010; 
Prinz, 2010). Others, however, hold the position that attention 
and consciousness are distinct phenomena, with distinct func-
tions and neuronal mechanisms that can be dissociated through 
clever experimentation (Wundt, 1874; Iwasaki, 1993; Hardcastle, 
1997; Naccache et al., 2002; Lamme, 2003; Woodman and Luck, 
2003; Kentridge et al., 2004; Koch, 2004; Baars, 2005; Block, 2005; 
Bachmann, 2006; Dehaene et al., 2006; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; 
Tsuchiya and Koch, 2008a,b).
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the relationship 
between attention and consciousness. Many studies have shown a 
dissociation between attention and consciousness using psycho-
physics and neurophysiological measurements such as EEG, MEG, 
and fMRI. This review gives an update of our previous overviews 
(Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2008a,b). In the 
first half, we closely examine the question of the necessity and 
sufficiency of attention for conscious perception. In the second 
half, we review experiments published after our previous reviews. 
These studies contrast the effects of attention and consciousness 
for a given percept by independently manipulating the two. Some 
studies successfully dissociate attention and consciousness, while 
some even show opposing effects of attention and consciousness.
As consciousness is notoriously difficult to define, we here use an 
operational definition. We will equate consciousness for an object or 
event, say a stationary grating, with stimulus visibility. As long as the 
IntroductIon
Although often used in everyday speech and in the scholarly lit-
erature, “selective attention” and “consciousness” lack clear defini-
tions. Partly because of this deficit there exists a lively debate on the 
relationship between the two. For clarity, we start with stating our 
usage of the terms “attention” and “consciousness”. We use the term 
“attention” to imply selective attention, rather than the processes that 
control the overall level of arousal and alertness. We focus on top-
down, goal-directed endogenous attention and not on bottom-up, 
saliency-driven exogenous attention (Itti and Koch, 2001). We do 
so because top-down attention and consciousness can be independ-
ently manipulated without changing the visual inputs (e.g., van 
Boxtel et al., 2010), while bottom-up attention, almost by definition, 
needs to be manipulated by changing the physical properties of a 
cueing stimulus, such as its visual features or its spatio-temporal 
relationship with a target stimulus. Thus, it is difficult to disentan-
gle bottom-up attention from consciousness (but see Chica et al., 
2010). By consciousness, we refer to the content of consciousness 
(sometimes also referred to as awareness), and not to states or lev-
els of consciousness (e.g., wakefulness, dreamless sleep or coma). 
Furthermore, we restrict this review to visual attention and visual 
consciousness, as the psychology and the neurophysiology of vision 
is much better understood than those of other modalities.
It is generally acknowledged that attention and perceptual con-
sciousness share an intimate relationship. When an observer pays 
attention to an object, he or she becomes conscious of its various 
attributes; when attention shifts away, the object seems to fade from 
consciousness. Because of this tight relationship many scholars 
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invisible grating that is not attended will still lead to a visible after-
image (e.g., van Boxtel et al., 2010). That is, the formation of after-
images can be independent of paying attention to the inducer nor 
of consciously perceiving it.
In the first half of the review, we focus on the rest of the matrix: 
attention without consciousness (bottom-left) and consciousness 
without attention (top-right). We examine whether attention is 
necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness.
While many scholars agree that attention and consciousness are 
distinct, it is popular to assume that attention is necessary for con-
sciousness. For example, Dehaene et al. (2006) argue that without 
top-down attention, an event cannot be consciously perceived and 
remains in a preconscious state. Another view is that attention and 
consciousness are so intertwined that they cannot be operationally 
separated (O’Regan and Noe, 2001; De Brigard and Prinz, 2010; 
Prinz, 2010). Below we will briefly review lines of research that 
have shaped this debate.
EvIdEncE for a tIght lInk bEtwEEn attEntIon and 
conscIousnEss
Evidence for a tight link between attention and consciousness 
comes from research showing that without attention conscious-
ness (or performance) fails. For example, even a very salient object, 
presented for a few seconds, sometimes goes unnoticed if it is 
not properly attended: inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock, 
1998; Wolfe et al., 2005). Similarly, when a target stimulus draws 
attention, another target that rapidly follows it in temporal suc-
cession is unlikely to be seen: attentional blink (Raymond et al., 
1992; Chun and Potter, 1995). Also, a major change between two 
subsequent images may go unnoticed if attention is not focused 
on the change: change blindness (Rensink et al., 1997; Tse, 2004; 
Wolfe et al., 2006). Visual sensitivity decreases when attention is 
subject can see the grating, he or she is conscious of the grating or 
of one or more of its attributes (its location, orientation, contrast). 
Other operational definitions involve subjective confidence or wager-
ing procedures (e.g., Persaud et al., 2007; Wilimzig et al., 2008).
functIonal consIdEratIons Imply a dIssocIatIon
The visual system is constantly bombarded with information, 
leading to a data deluge that cannot be processed in real time; 
on the order of one megabyte of raw information exits the ret-
ina every second. The prime goal of visual attention therefore is 
to select information to meet current behavioral goals (James, 
1890; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004). By definition this implies 
a relative decrease of processing resources for non-attended 
locations or features. Such attentional selection can be based on 
bottom-up, exogenous  saliency-based factors or top-down, endog-
enous, goal-directed factors (James, 1890; Braun and Julesz, 1998; 
Duncan, 1998; Koch, 2004). Top-down attention, the focus of this 
review, selects a portion of the input defined by a circumscribed 
region in space (spatial or focal attention), by a particular feature 
( feature-based attention), or by an object (object-based attention) 
for further processing.
Consciousness is surmised to have functions almost diametri-
cally opposite to those of attention. It does not select information. 
Rather, proposed roles of consciousness include summarizing 
all relevant information pertaining to the current state of the 
organism and its environment and making this compact sum-
mary accessible to the planning stages of the brain, detecting 
anomalies and errors, decision making, language, inferring the 
internal state of other animals, setting long-term goals, making 
recursive models, and rational thought. This integrative aspect 
is emphasized by the Integrated Information Theory of con-
sciousness (Tononi, 2004, 2008). These functions also suggest 
that consciousness may be important at longer timescales than 
attention is, and may not be operating at the same level in the 
visual hierarchy.
From this viewpoint, we can regard selective, focal attention as 
an analyzer and consciousness as a synthesizer. To the extent that 
one accepts that attention and consciousness have different func-
tions, one has to accept that they cannot be the same process, and 
anticipate dissociations between the two.
thE four-fold way of procEssIng vIsual EvEnts 
and bEhavIors
Previously, we argued that each behavior or percept can be cat-
egorized within a 2 × 2 design matrix, defined by whether it gives 
rise to consciousness and whether it requires top-down attentional 
amplification (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007).
The lower right quadrant of our attention × consciousness 
design matrix (Table 1) is filled with behaviors or percepts in which 
attention is necessary for them to give rise to consciousness. For 
example, an unexpected and unfamiliar stimulus requires top-
down attention in order to be consciously perceived. Otherwise, 
such a stimulus goes unnoticed, a phenomenon called inattentional 
blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998).
At the top-left of the table are behaviors or percepts that do not 
require the deployment of top-down attention, and that can occur 
in the absence of conscious perception. For instance, a  perceptually 
Table 1 | A four-fold classification of percepts and behaviors depending 
on whether or not top-down attention is necessary and whether or not 
these percepts and behaviors give rise to phenomenal consciousness. 
Different percepts and behaviors are grouped together according to 
these two, psychophysically defined, criteria.
Can be found without 
consciousness
Percepts/behaviors 
that give rise to 
consciousness
Top-down attention 
is not required
Formation of 
afterimages
Pop-out
Rapid vision (<120 ms) Iconic memory
Gist
Zombie behaviors Animal and gender 
detection in dual-tasks
Partial reportability
Top-down attention 
is required
Priming
Adaptation
Processing of objects
Visual search
Thoughts
Working memory
Detection and 
discrimination of 
unexpected and 
unfamiliar stimuli
Full reportability
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quadrant in Table 1). From the point of view of consciousness, 
the first question asks whether attention is sufficient to cause 
consciousness, while the second one asks whether attention is 
necessary to cause consciousness (or whether only attentionally 
selected items can enter into consciousness). We will review these 
questions below. 
attEntIon wIthout conscIousnEss
Can observers deploy attention to a stimulus that is not accessible 
to consciousness? The answer now seems quite definitely: yes, they 
can. The evidence comes from (1) the attentional manipulation 
of non-conscious priming and adaptation and (2) the effects of 
invisible stimuli on attentional cueing.
Behavioral (Naccache et al., 2002; Ansorge and Neumann, 2005; 
Melcher et al., 2005; Sumner et al., 2006; Kentridge et al., 2008; 
Finkbeiner and Palermo, 2009; Tapia et al., 2010; Van den Bussche 
et al., 2010) and neuronal (Kiefer and Brendel, 2006) non-conscious 
priming is enhanced by spatial (Kentridge et al., 2008; Finkbeiner 
and Palermo, 2009; Van den Bussche et al., 2010), feature-based 
(Melcher et al., 2005; Tapia et al., 2010), or temporal (i.e., cueing 
when the prime or targets appear) (Naccache et al., 2002) attention. 
So far, there is no evidence that object-based attention can give rise 
to non-conscious priming (Tapia et al., 2010).
Likewise, the strength of adaptation to perceptually invis-
ible (attributes of) stimuli such as orientation (He et al., 1996; 
Montaser-Kouhsari and Rajimehr, 2004; Kanai et al., 2006; Bahrami 
et al., 2008a,b; Shin et al., 2009) or the gender of faces (Shin et al., 
2009) is increased by enhancing spatial and feature-based atten-
tion to these features. When the invisible orientation is defined by 
illusory contours, spatial attention is even necessary for adaptation 
(Montaser-Kouhsari and Rajimehr, 2004).
A further piece of evidence comes from a blindsight patient 
GY. Though GY cannot consciously perceive visual stimuli in his 
contralesional (blind) visual field, he can be primed by a cue that 
attracts attention to his blind visual field. This is true even though 
the cue itself and the target are both invisible (Kentridge et al., 
1999a,b, 2004).
The existence of attentional deployment without conscious 
registration of a stimulus is also supported by studies that showed 
attentional cueing effects on sub-threshold or invisible stimuli 
(Rajimehr, 2004; Jiang et al., 2006; Tsushima et al., 2006, 2008; 
Sato et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2008, 2009; Meteyard et al., 2008; 
Bauer et al., 2009). Tsushima et al. (2006) (see also Meteyard 
et al., 2008; Tsushima et al., 2008) even showed that random 
dot motion stimuli, whose coherency is so low that subjects 
cannot discriminate their motion direction above chance, are 
more distracting and detrimental for a concurrently performed 
central task than motion stimuli with high coherency. Using 
fMRI, it was shown that compared to supra-threshold motion, 
sub-threshold motion evokes stronger hemodynamic activa-
tion in the motion sensitive cortical area, MT, because the weak 
sensory stimulus does not activate an area in lateral prefrontal 
cortex (LPFC) that is presumed to be responsible for inhibiting 
distracting motion-related activity in MT. Taken together, these 
studies demonstrate attention can be directed toward and away 
from a stimulus or one of its attributes without that stimulus or 
attribute ever being visible.
distracted: load-induced blindness (Macdonald and Lavie, 2008). 
Furthermore, damages to various parts of the cortex, including 
frontal and parietal regions and the temporo-parietal junction 
(Swan, 2001; Vallar, 2001, 2007), and subcortical areas such as the 
pulvinar (Werth et al., 1986; Swan, 2001), result in invisibility of 
stimuli in one hemifield, in particular when there is an competing 
object in the other hemifield: visual neglect (Driver, 1998). These 
studies show that when attention is not appropriately directed to 
an object, its conscious report can fail, supporting the view that 
attention and awareness are tightly linked.
However, in most of these studies the stimuli are actually per-
ceived, only not in fine detail. When sensitivity is empirically 
measured under attended and unattended conditions for identical 
visual inputs, several studies showed nearly no change in detection 
thresholds (Lee et al., 1999a; Morrone et al., 2002; Tsuchiya and 
Braun, 2007). In particular, detection of an isolated object is rarely 
affected by attention (Braun and Julesz, 1998). In fact, in load-
induced blindness (Macdonald and Lavie, 2008), the d’ values are 
far greater than 0 (i.e., >1). That is, the stimuli are often perceived, 
a condition far from true “blindness”.
Sometimes, however, a relatively large stimulus or change can go 
unnoticed when attention is not properly directed, as mentioned 
above. We believe this is because subjects do perceive the gist of the 
image correctly, interfering detection of a less meaningful change 
in the scene as if it was filled in by the gist. In fact, when a stimulus 
or image change is related to the gist of the scene, attention-related 
blindness rarely occurs. For example, when natural images are 
abruptly and totally unexpectedly flashed, inattentional blindness 
was not observed. That is, subjects can describe the gist of these 
photos (Mack and Rock, 1998). Similarly, the attentional blink 
decreases when two subsequent target stimuli differ in their gist 
compared to when they contain the same gist (Evans and Treisman, 
2005; Einhäuser et al., 2007). The case of change blindness is per-
haps most telling. A most effective demonstration of change blind-
ness utilizes two photographs with an identical gist (e.g., soldiers 
near an airplane) with a change that does not modify the gist (e.g., 
airplane with or without an engine). However, if one uses a minor 
change that alters the gist between two images (for example, “a 
log immediately in the path of a man kayaking down a river was 
changed into another kayak,” Sampanes et al., 2008), observers 
notice the change much faster than when the gist did not change 
(e.g., the log was replaced by a rock) (Sampanes et al., 2008).
We conclude that attentional reduction does not usually result 
in invisibility of an isolated object and that a large change can be 
missed as long as it does not alter the gist of the scene. Attention and 
consciousness may not be coupled as tightly as has been thought 
even in the above cases.
EvIdEncE for a dIssocIatIon bEtwEEn attEntIon and 
conscIousnEss
Due to the recent surge in research on attention and consciousness, 
there is now ample evidence for a dissociation between the two 
processes. There are two sides to this story that are of particular 
interest: Can attention be deployed to a stimulus attribute, object 
or event without giving rise to consciousness of that attribute, 
object or event? (bottom-left quadrant in Table 1); and, can one be 
 conscious of something without paying attention to it? ( top-right 
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When there is competition among objects, top-down attention 
exerts a major gating role for consciousness, yet not all the aspects of 
vision are affected equally. In the dual-task paradigm, spatial atten-
tion is focused at fixation by a demanding task, while performance is 
measured on a simultaneously presented peripheral stimulus. Dual-
task studies have shown that simple detection and discrimination 
of a stimulus in a pop-out array is not compromised when atten-
tion is drawn away (Braun and Sagi, 1990; Braun and Julesz, 1998). 
Furthermore, the gist of a natural scene picture as well as gender 
and identity of a face can be perceived under dual-task conditions 
(Figure 1A; Mack and Rock, 1998; Fei-Fei et al., 2002; Reddy et al., 
2004, 2006, see also Torralba et al., 2006; Alvarez and Oliva, 2008, 
2009). Interestingly, what is considered a change in gist and what not, 
seems to be affected by expertise (Werner and Thies, 2000). This sug-
gests that consciousness without attention develops in response to 
extensive experience with a particular class of images. (It is currently 
unknown why some classes of extensive training result in reduction 
of consciousness (action without perception, Milner and Goodale, 
2008) while others result in enhancement of consciousness (faces 
and gist). We believe tackling this problem with neuroscientific tools 
can be a fruitful research project in the future.) 
Discrimination of other stimuli – for example, discriminating 
an arbitrarily rotated letter “L” from an arbitrarily rotated letter 
“T” – is severely affected when spatial attention is soaked up by the 
central task (Figure 1A, right panel). While it cannot be guaranteed 
that observers deploy no top-down attention what-so-ever to the 
peripheral stimulus in these dual-tasks experiments, these experi-
ments do show that subjects can perform certain discriminations 
but not others in the near absence of top-down attention.
Note that these findings are grosso modo in accordance with the 
data that is argued to provide evidence for a tight link between 
attention and awareness. Without top-down attention, observers 
cannot report the details of a scene even though they may errone-
ously claim to have seen a certain stimulus with high confidence 
(de Gardelle et al., 2009). Yet, observers often do perceive the gist 
of the scene and can accurately perceive the category of the object 
(whether it is a face, a natural scene, a letter, etc.). Even with a mere 
30 ms exposure to natural scenes, followed by a mask, observers 
can clearly perceive their gist (Biederman, 1972; Fei-Fei et al., 2002) 
even in the absence of any expectation about what type of scene 
will be flashed. Within these 30 ms, top-down attentional bias could 
not have taken effect.
ImagIng studIEs of thE dual-task paradIgm
Faces and natural scenes are also extensively studied with fMRI 
under the divided attention condition (for example, Wojciulik 
et al., 1998; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Peelen et al., 2009). Among 
them, two recent studies employed the dual-task paradigm (Reddy 
et al., 2007; Houtkamp and Braun, 2010) with a tight control on 
attentional allocation.
The first study (Reddy et al., 2007) looked at the BOLD response 
in the fusiform face area (FFA) to faces presented in the periphery 
under a dual-task condition (a central letter task and a peripheral 
gender discrimination task). The BOLD response in FFA increased 
when a face was presented compared to when it was absent, regard-
less of the attentional state. This activation was equally strong when 
subjects performed only the gender task and when they carried out 
opEn quEstIons and thE nEuronal basIs of attEntIon wIthout 
conscIousnEss
While top-down attention can operate without giving rise to con-
sciousness, many open questions remain. For example, what is the 
nature of attentional selection of invisible stimuli? Can the representa-
tion of an invisible “object” be modulated by any type of attention or 
only indirectly via temporal, spatial or feature-based attention, yet not 
object-based attention (De Brigard and Prinz, 2010; Prinz, 2010; Tapia 
et al., 2010)? Can attention bind features of an invisible object (Lin 
and He, 2009)? As to this last question, some evidence from a Balint’s 
patient (Wojciulik and Kanwisher, 1998) suggest that consciousness 
is not required for binding (but see Tapia et al., 2010). Attention is not 
a unitary concept and it is quite plausible that some components of 
attention, such as object-based attention, may be very difficult to sepa-
rate empirically from consciousness. These are unresolved issues.
Another question is whether the modulation of invisible stimuli by 
spatial- or feature-based attention is the rule rather than the exception 
(Finkbeiner and Palermo, 2009; Shin et al., 2009)? Conventional psy-
chophysical methods, such as binocular rivalry (Chong et al., 2005), 
have failed to find any attentional modulation of invisible stimuli. 
However, an fMRI study by Bahrami et al. (2007) showed enhanced 
BOLD activity at the location of invisible images of tools during 
a low-load attentional condition at fixation. The authors interpret 
this as hemodynamic evidence for increased attentional processing 
of the invisible stimuli in V1 (with a similar trend in V2 and V3). It 
would be important to understand what kind of stimuli, tasks, and 
techniques result in strong attentional effects on perceptually invis-
ible stimuli and what these effects entail. For example, synchrony or 
coherence in a population of spiking neurons (Womelsdorf and Fries, 
2007) may be responsible for the attentional selection of invisible 
stimuli but not for consciousness. Another critical question is why 
the attentional enhancement of neuronal activity is not sufficient for 
conscious perception (Braun, 2007). Insufficient stimulus strength 
is probably an important  factor (Dehaene et al., 2006).
conscIousnEss wIthout attEntIon
If there is attention without consciousness, one can ask whether 
or not there exists consciousness without attention. Can a subject 
be conscious of an object or of an attribute of an object without 
attending to the object or its attribute? We focus on evidence in 
favor of that view obtained with the dual-task paradigm. Other lines 
of evidence, including pop-out, iconic memory, and partial report-
ability, have been reviewed extensively elsewhere (Block, 2007; Koch 
and Tsuchiya, 2007; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2008a,b; Lamme, 2010).
Top-down attention is employed when there is competition 
among two or more nearby objects (Desimone and Duncan, 
1995). In fact, almost all the neurophysiological studies of visual 
attention employ stimulus configurations that engender compe-
tition of resources, for example, by placing two objects within a 
receptive field of a recorded neuron. Without competition, that is 
when a single stimulus is presented in an otherwise empty field, it 
is very difficult to observe any top-down attentional modulation 
(Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004). At the perceptual level, if a display 
contains only a single object in isolation, subjects become aware of 
it in any attentional state. This simple fact seems to undermine the 
argument that top-down attentional amplification from the frontal 
area is always necessary for consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006).
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with a near-perfect performance on the masked peripheral task in 
the (near) absence of attention – could be explained by the poten-
tial presence of other forms of attention (Reddy et al., 2007), or 
by a delayed attentional shift (Houtkamp and Braun, 2010) that 
is behaviorally non-relevant (because the iconic memory is over-
loaded with the mask).
These studies have not looked at differences between consciously 
perceived and non-perceived peripheral stimuli. Future studies are 
required to find more direct evidence of the neural correlates of 
consciousness (NCC) without attention.
crItIcIsms of thE posItIon that stImulus conscIousnEss can 
occur wIthout attEntIon
Some scholars (Prinz, 2010) criticize the dual-task paradigm because 
the results of these experiments can be explained by factors other 
than consciousness without top-down attention. They claim that 
natural stimuli such as faces and scenes draw more attention than 
a red-green disc, which enables their superior performance under 
the dual-task condition. However, the paired central task (typically, 
discriminating a rotated L among four rotated Ts or the opposite 
from five rotated Ls or Ts) has a very tight linear performance-
resource function as in Figure 2 (Pastukhov et al., 2009). Thus, any 
withdrawal of attention toward faces or scenes would result in a 
drop of performance for the central task. Such a drop has not been 
observed (Fei-Fei et al., 2002; Reddy et al., 2004, 2006).
Another criticism is that superior performance does not guaran-
tee the presence of consciousness, as is evidenced in non-conscious 
behaviors in blindsight patients. That is, even though subjects could 
perform the task very well, they may not have consciously seen the 
peripheral stimuli. While this is contradicted by the first person 
experience when performing the task, it may be possible that the 
link between performance and consciousness is not as strong as 
intuitively felt. This is an empirical issue that needs to be further 
both the gender and the central tasks (Figure 1B, right panel). When 
only the central task was performed, ignoring the peripheral faces, 
the FFA activity decreased (but was still above baseline; Figure 1B, 
right panel). The equal activation in the peripheral-task-only and 
dual-task conditions is consistent with the psychophysical results 
(Figure 1B, consciousness without attention) and suggests that 
there exists a non-spatial “top-down task-based attention” that was 
present when the peripheral stimulus was task-relevant but did not 
receive focused attention. This activity may or may not be related to 
feature-based attention. A similar pattern of results (i.e., sensitiv-
ity to unattended stimuli and a task-related activation) has been 
reported by Peelen et al. (2009) using natural scene stimuli.
A more recent experiment (Houtkamp and Braun, 2010) rep-
licated and expanded the above study, using fractal images, whose 
angle of rotation or color had to be discriminated. Discrimination 
of rotation required attention while that of color did not. This study, 
unlike Reddy et al. (2007), did not mask the peripheral stimulus 
after the 25 ms presentation window. Performance for the rotation 
discrimination in the unmasked condition was much better than in 
the masked condition. The increased performance in the unmasked 
situations was assumed to result from a delayed attentional shift to 
the peripheral stimulus, and a read-out of the iconic memory (i.e., 
a brief, ∼500 ms visual memory of recent visual events; Sperling, 
1960) at the peripheral location. For the masked stimuli, this atten-
tional shift is also assumed to take place, but because the stimulus 
is masked, the attentional shift does not improve the behavioral 
performance. However, because in both cases the attentional shift 
is presumed to take place, the fMRI signal in both cases should 
increase at the peripheral location, which was indeed the case in 
early visual cortex (Houtkamp and Braun, 2010).
These studies show that behaviorally relevant peripheral stimuli 
activate visual cortex in situations that indicate consciousness in 
the absence of focused attention. This activity – which is correlated 
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Figure 1 | Consciousness without attention: Behavioral performance and 
fMri measures in the dual-task paradigm. (A) Typical results in an experiment 
comparing single task performance (normalized and plotted along the x and y axes, 
such that they function as a reference for dual-task performance), and dual-task 
performance. The left panel shows the performance for gender discrimination and 
the central attention-demanding task when performed simultaneously. Each circle 
corresponds to the dual-task performance of one subject. Performance is near 
optimal for both tasks, even though the central letter task is highly demanding. The 
right panel shows data for a peripheral task involving discriminating a green-red 
from a red-green bisected disk in combination with the same central task as in the 
left panel. Although this task seems much simpler from a computational point of 
view than the one in the left panel, it cannot be performed simultaneously with the 
central letter task. (B) Left panel: averaged performance in the face gender task 
with or without the central task, replotted from (A). Right panel: fMRI measures at 
the location in FFA corresponding to the faces show a pattern very similar to the 
behavioral data, namely high BOLD activity (and performance) for both peripheral 
and dual tasks, and reduced activity when the faces are presented but are of no 
behavioral relevance (Adapted from Reddy et al., 2007).
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four independently moving items. It is an open question if such 
a separate and independent resource also exists for tasks that 
involve faces and natural scenes.
dIffErEnt kInds of rElatIonshIp bEtwEEn task pErformancE 
and attEntIonal rEsourcE
Figure 2 provides a schematized overview of the previously dis-
cussed dual-task experiments. The y-axis shows normalized task 
performance, where 50% corresponds to chance and 100% cor-
responds to maximal performance when the task is performed on 
its own (i.e., single task performance). The x-axis plots the amount 
of attention needed for the peripheral task (Lee et al., 1999b; 
Pastukhov et al., 2009). For some tasks, such as discrimination 
of rotated letters and red-green bisected disc, the task perform-
ance and the amount of attention is almost linearly related. When 
these tasks are used as the central task, they serve as a very sensi-
tive attentional assay, as a canary in a coal mine, because even a 
minimal shift of attention to the periphery would decrease the 
central performance. Other tasks show a near complete resistance 
to attention-deprivation. Such tasks include pop-out (Braun and 
Sagi, 1990; Braun and Julesz, 1998), scene categorization (Fei-Fei 
et al., 2002), gender discrimination (Reddy et al., 2004), and face 
identification (Reddy et al., 2006). In these tasks, performance does 
not drop when they are performed simultaneously with the highly 
demanding central task: these tasks do not compete for attention 
or require only limited attentional resources. Still other tasks need 
an intermediate amount of attention (e.g., gender discrimination 
in inverted faces; Reddy et al., 2004).
Consciousness for any one stimulus attribute seems to be an 
all-or-none process (Koch, 2004; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004), influ-
enced by various factors, including neural variability (Hesselmann 
et al., 2008). If we crudely assume that, on average, consciousness is 
reached when performance reaches 75% in Figure 2A, we can trans-
form panel A into a plot showing the attention threshold at which 
an observer becomes conscious of different stimuli (Figure 2B).
This way of representing the relationship between attention and 
consciousness captures the known properties of the psychophysical 
data. The presentation chosen in Figure 2A also allows for con-
ditions of “attention without consciousness” and “consciousness 
without attention”, while still preserving a positive relationship 
between attention and consciousness, which researchers intuitively 
assume to exist. Still, we acknowledge that this depiction is also 
vulnerable to the criticisms mentioned above (see “Criticisms on 
consciousness without attention”). Currently, the major obstacle 
for solving the question of whether there is consciousness without 
attention is that there is no objective psychophysical way to unam-
biguously determine a state of “complete absence of attention”. It 
is not known whether the conditions measured in the dual-task 
paradigms are cases of “very low attention” or “no attention” (gray 
area on the left in Figure 2A). Nevertheless, different attributes 
clearly require different amounts of attention to become visible.
on thE EffEcts of attEntIon and conscIousnEss
So far, we have reviewed studies that directly asked whether 
attention is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. We 
concluded that attention to a stimulus or an attribute of this stim-
ulus is neither strictly necessary nor sufficient for the  stimulus 
studied in the future. For example, one could compare the contents 
of our perception between conditions of full and divided atten-
tion. Under a single task condition (i.e., “full” attention), verbal 
reports of the gist have been analyzed for a briefly presented and 
masked natural scene stimulus (Fei-Fei et al., 2007), and it was 
concluded that, indeed, the gist of a scene could be verbalized in a 
relatively detailed manner. A similar approach could be taken under 
dual-task conditions, to analyze the contents of our perception in 
these situations.
Conclusions from the dual-task experiments rest on one 
strong assumption about the nature of top-down attention: 
that attention is a unified and limited resource and all the tasks 
compete for it, to different degrees. Although most empirical 
evidence supports such a view (Duncan et al., 1997; Lee et al., 
1999b; Pastukhov et al., 2009), multiple-object tracking casts 
some doubt on this assumption (Alvarez and Cavanagh, 2005). 
In multiple-object tracking, full attentional resources seem to 
be independently available for each hemifield to track at least 
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Figure 2 | Schematic framework for the relationship between attention 
and task performance. (A) Performance-resource functions, which show 
psychophysical performance for a given amount of allocated attention. Each 
curve describes this relationship for different types of discrimination tasks; 
some discrimination tasks require a lot of attentional resources (lower 
diagonal line), others require little (middle diagonal line) or no (top line) 
attentional resources. Note that each of the four corners in this plot depicts 
one of the quadrants in Table 1 (here A = attention, and C = consciousness). 
(B) Let us assume that when observers can consciously discriminate two 
stimuli at 75% correct, they are conscious of the difference to a certain 
degree. If we accept this, we can measure an attention threshold for a given 
aspect of visual attribute: how much attention is required to achieve a certain 
level of conscious discrimination. For example, the attentional threshold for 
natural scene discrimination (top line) is much lower than those for 
discriminating red/green bisected discs or rotated letters (bottom line).
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correlated with attention slightly later, for 350–500 ms in parietal 
sensors. These effects did not interact with each other and suggest 
that attention and consciousness may have dissociable neuronal 
correlates.
studIEs that havE shown dEtrImEntal EffEcts of attEntIon
Under most circumstances in everyday life and most labora-
tory tasks, attention, and consciousness both improve task per-
formance and/or enhance perceptual experience (Posner, 1994; 
Jackendoff, 1996; Velmans, 1996; Merikle and Joordens, 1997; 
Mack and Rock, 1998; Chun and Wolfe, 2000; O’Regan and Noe, 
2001; Mole, 2008; De Brigard and Prinz, 2010; Prinz, 2010). Yet if 
attention and consciousness are supported by different neuronal 
mechanisms, there might be cases where attention paradoxically 
impairs performance or reduces the intensity of perceptual experi-
ences. Indeed, such results have been reported in various sensory, 
cognitive and motor studies, indicating that the effects of atten-
tion and consciousness are not monolithic, and can potentially 
even be opposed to each other.
Top-down attention and learning are generally tightly positively 
correlated (e.g., Kruschke, 2001). However, in implicit learning, 
attentively trying to discover an underlying complex rule in an 
artificial grammar task delays implicit learning and impairs subse-
quent recognition (Reber, 1976). Similarly, attention to a location 
impedes task-irrelevant perceptual learning at that location (Choi 
et al., 2009). During the execution of overlearnt sensory-motor 
skills, such as dribbling a soccer ball or keyboard typing, attending 
to the specific skill impairs performance (Beilock et al., 2002; Logan 
and Crump, 2009). Recognition memory can decrease when the 
subject’s attention is directed to the task-relevant complex kalei-
doscopic visual stimulus under certain circumstances (Voss et al., 
2008; Voss and Paller, 2009) (Figure 3A). This is quite surprising 
as recognition memory generally improves the longer the stimulus 
is visible (e.g., Martini and Maljkovic, 2009; Figure 3B). Although 
this paradoxical effect seems to occur in a limited situation (i.e., 
when the to-be-remembered item is difficult to verbalize, when 
distracters are highly similar to remembered items, etc.), it is worth 
following up these results in a full-factorial design.
Top-down attention is thought to play a critical role in bringing 
stimuli into consciousness. However, some visual illusions dem-
onstrate a counterintuitive aspect of attention on the visibility of 
an object. In motion-induced blindness (MIB), a salient stimulus 
can be rendered invisible when it is surrounded by moving dots 
(Bonneh et al., 2001). Yet, paradoxically, when more attention is paid 
to the salient stimulus the stimulus disappears faster (Figure 3C; 
Geng et al., 2007; Scholvinck and Rees, 2009). Surprisingly, the 
more salient the stationary yellow squares, the stronger the sup-
pression (Bonneh et al., 2001). In Troxler fading (Troxler, 1804), 
a stimulus placed in the visual periphery fades from awareness 
when fixation is held correctly. This fading happens faster when 
attention is directed to the peripheral stimulus (Babington Smith, 
1961; Lou, 1999). In the attentional blink, observers can see both 
the first and the second targets better when they are distracted by 
a simultaneous auditory dual task or encouraged to think about 
task-irrelevant events (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005). In all of the 
above cases, the more subjects try to see some stimulus by paying 
attention to, the less visible it becomes!
or its attribute to be consciously perceived. In the second half 
of this review, which revolves around many studies that have 
appeared after our previous reviews, we review a complementary 
approach to the same question by asking whether the behav-
ioral and neuronal “effects” of attention and consciousness on 
performance or on other measures are qualitatively similar or 
not. If the neuronal processes underlying attention and con-
sciousness are largely independent (Dehaene et al., 2006; Koch 
and Tsuchiya, 2007; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2008a,b), independent 
manipulation of attention and consciousness might result in 
different, possibly even opposite, effects at the perceptual, behav-
ioral or neuronal levels.
IndEpEndEnt manIpulatIon of attEntIon and conscIousnEss
The recent upsurge in studying the relationship between attention 
and consciousness encouraged experiments employing a full facto-
rial, independent manipulation of attention and consciousness.
Van den Bussche et al. (2010) examined the magnitude of 
priming effects by independently manipulating prime visibility 
and spatial attention, leading to a full factorial 2 × 2 design. The 
prime could signal the same behavioral response as the subsequent 
stimulus (a congruent trial) or an opposite behavioral response (an 
incongruent trial). When the prime was invisible and unattended, 
no priming effects were found. Compared to this baseline condi-
tion, both attention and awareness increased the priming effects. 
However, each manipulation contributed to the priming effects in 
distinct ways: when attention was directed to the invisible prime, 
the reaction times for the congruent trials were speeded compared 
to neutral trials, while when visibility was increased for the unat-
tended prime, the reaction times for the incongruent trials were 
slowed down compared to the neutral condition. In other words, 
attention to invisible stimuli and visibility of unattended stimuli 
both enhanced the priming effects, but via distinctive neuronal 
mechanisms. In visible and attended conditions, both the speed-
ing up of congruent trials and the slowing down of incongruent 
trials occurred.
Kanai et al. (2006) investigated the magnitude of the tilt afteref-
fect by independently manipulating attention and consciousness. 
Attention showed an interesting effect. While feature-based atten-
tion increased the size of the aftereffect regardless of the visibility 
of the adaptor, spatial attention did so only when the adapting 
stimulus was visible. While later studies showed that spatial atten-
tion could modulate the tilt aftereffect (Bahrami et al., 2008a,b) 
it is still important to know whether different kinds of attention 
(spatial, feature-based, and object-based) act on visible and invis-
ible stimuli with different sensitivity. As to conscious perception, 
it had a similar influence as attention, increasing the strength of 
the aftereffect.
Wyart and Tallon-Baudry (2008) utilized MEG to dissociate 
neuronal correlates of attention and consciousness. They showed 
subjects a faint stimulus, which was visible in roughly half of 
the trials. They manipulated spatial attention by an endogenous 
cue. In a time-frequency analyses of MEG power, mid-frequency 
(54–64 Hz) gamma activity was correlated with stimulus visibility 
for a sustained period, from 250 to 500 ms, in occipital sensors, 
contralateral to the stimulus. Independent of this awareness-
related activity, high-frequency (76–90 Hz) gamma activity was 
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opposItE EffEcts of attEntIon and conscIousnEss on 
pErcEptIon but not on adaptatIon
One of the most striking pieces of evidence for distinctive neuronal 
processes for attention and consciousness comes from the studies 
of afterimages. Afterimages were long thought to have their sole 
The above-mentioned studies show some paradoxical effects of 
attention. Note, however, that a complete orthogonal manipulation 
of attention and consciousness has not been performed in any of 
these examples. Some more examples of the counterintuitive nature 
of attention are reviewed elsewhere (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2008b).
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Figure 3 | Some detrimental influences of attention, and effects of 
attention opposite to those of consciousness. (A) When attention is paid to a 
stimulus it is generally assumed that recognition memory increases. This is true 
for an explicit memory task (left panel; here, subjects had to report whether or 
not they had seen a test stimulus), but not for a task tapping more into implicit 
memory (right panel: subjects were forced to choose which one of two similar 
fractal stimuli were presented previously). In the latter task, recognition memory 
decreased when attention was directed toward the to-be-remembered object. 
This study also shows that the type of report asked from the subject can greatly 
influence the results (Adapted from Voss et al., 2008) (B) In a task where people 
had to indicate whether or not a natural image was previously seen, 
consciousness, or visibility as expressed in presentation duration, of a 
to-be-remembered item causes an increase in performance for recognition 
memory (as expressed in the adjusted hit-rate for remembered items, corrected 
for guesses). (Adapted from Martini and Maljkovic, 2009). (C) In motion-induced 
blindness, paying attention to a stimulus causes that stimulus to disappear with 
a greater probability (left and right panels: attention is directed to different 
locations) (Adapted from Scholvinck and Rees, 2009) (D). Attention and 
consciousness (i.e., visibility) have opposing effects on afterimage duration. 
When a stimulus is visible (left panel) it will leave a longer afterimage than when 
it is invisible (right panel). At the same time, paying attention to a stimulus 
decreases the duration of the afterimage (Adapted from van Boxtel et al., 2010). 
Note that (A,C,D) have a similar layout but that different measures are reported 
on the y-axis, and in the comparisons between the left and right panels. 
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 consciousness. In the above experiment the change in conscious 
visibility was induced by a stimulus change. To remove the artifacts 
associated with the stimulus change, we utilized random fluctuations 
in visibility due to binocular rivalry, and due to Troxler fading and 
confirmed similar results (van Boxtel et al., 2010).
In a related study, the effects of attention and consciousness 
on afterimages were investigated over a range of spatial frequen-
cies (Brascamp et al., 2010). Using signal detection theory, these 
authors showed that the difference between the effects of atten-
tion and awareness can be pinned down to the different manner 
in which attention and awareness influence different visual chan-
nels. Briefly, afterimage duration is determined by the strength 
of adaptation of both phase-sensitive and phase-insensitive visual 
channels (Suzuki and Grabowecky, 2003; Wede and Francis, 2007; 
Francis, 2010). The afterimage appears stronger when the adapta-
tion of phase-sensitive channels is increased, because afterimages 
originate from this adaptation. In contrast, when adaptation in 
phase-insensitive channels is increased the afterimage looks weaker, 
because this adaptation increases detection thresholds, thus making 
the afterimage harder to see (Leguire and Blake, 1982; Georgeson 
and Turner, 1985). Brascamp and colleagues showed that attention 
and consciousness increased adaptation in both channels, and that 
afterimage durations reflect the balance between these two fac-
tors. The observed opposite effects of afterimage durations at the 
perceptual level are caused by a change in balance between both 
channels (due to adaptation), rather than being due to opposite 
effects at an early neural level. Interestingly, however, the adap-
tation effects of attention and consciousness were correlated for 
phase- insensitive adaptation, while they were uncorrelated for 
phase-sensitive  adaptation (Brascamp et al., 2010).
Taken together Brascamp et al. (2010) and van Boxtel et al. (2010) 
showed that attention and consciousness can have opposing effects 
on visual perception, while still performing similar, yet not identi-
cal, operations at a neural level. Whether this finding is limited to 
afterimages or is a more common phenomenon remains open.
We have reviewed data that suggest some type of functional 
dissociation between attention and consciousness. But what are 
the respective anatomical and neuronal bases? This question is 
hard to answer, and would require a whole other review article. 
Effects of consciousness (e.g., Rees et al., 2002) and attention (e.g., 
Corbetta and Shulman, 2002) have been found throughout the 
brain. However, no fMRI study has used a 2 × 2 factorial design to 
dissect the anatomical underpinnings of attention and conscious-
ness, making it difficult to assign one or another brain area to either 
attention or consciousness. Wyart and Tallon-Baudry (2008) have 
performed an experiment pitting attention against consciousness, 
but the MEG signals did not allow for precise anatomic localization 
(but they did show a separable influence of attention and conscious-
ness on different frequency bands in the MEG signal).
There are some striking parallels between the two-stream 
hypothesis for perception and action on the one hand (Trevarthen, 
1968; Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982; Milner and Goodale, 1993, 
2008 ), and the division between attention and consciousness on 
the other hand.
Attention primarily reduces the complexity of incoming input 
so that the brain can process it online and in real time. This might/
could be the function of Milner and Goodale’s (2008) dorsal  visual 
origin in the retina (Alpern and Barr, 1962; Brindley, 1962; Loomis, 
1972, 1978; Sakitt, 1976; Virsu and Laurinen, 1977; Wilson, 1997), 
which is impervious to attention and awareness-related signals (in 
mammals, there are no central fibers that project back into the 
retina). However, there is now increasing evidence that cortical 
sites also play an important role in afterimage formation (Shimojo 
et al., 2001; Gilroy and Blake, 2005; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005); for 
example, removing stimuli from awareness by inter-ocular sup-
pression decreases afterimage duration and strength (Gilroy and 
Blake, 2005; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005).
Interestingly, attentional withdrawal increases afterimage dura-
tions (Lou, 2001; Suzuki and Grabowecky, 2003; Wede and Francis, 
2007; Lak, 2008). This is quite counterintuitive because attention is 
thought to boost neuronal activity (Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; 
Reynolds and Heeger, 2009), which would result in stronger adapta-
tion (Ling and Carrasco, 2006; Rezec et al., 2004), leading to longer 
afterimages.
Even though an attention-related decrease and an awareness-
 related increase of afterimage strength and duration have been shown 
separately, different stimuli and different tasks were employed. It is 
essential that the effects of attention and consciousness be studied 
using identical stimuli and tasks. For example, stimulus parameters, 
such as the spatial frequency of the adaptor, are critical in determin-
ing the afterimage strength (Brascamp et al., 2010). Specifically, 
the decrease in afterimage duration with decreased visibility only 
occurs for low spatial frequency stimuli. For high-spatial frequency 
stimuli, a paradoxical increase in afterimage duration occurs with 
decreased visibility (Brascamp et al., 2010). These differences make 
previous research difficult to compare. Note that the increase in 
afterimage duration with decreased attention found in previous 
studies was obtained with high-spatial frequency stimuli.
A recent study (van Boxtel et al., 2010) addressed the separate 
influences of attention and awareness on afterimage perception, 
employing a full-factorial design while controlling stimulus and task 
confounds. Attention and awareness were independently manipu-
lated during the afterimage induction phase, while the effects of 
these manipulations were measured in the afterimage perception 
phase. Attention to the afterimage inducer was manipulated by 
employing an attention-distracting task at fixation (i.e., the central 
task). This task could be easy or hard (Lavie, 1995; Bahrami et al., 
2008b; Macdonald and Lavie, 2008), ensuring identical visual input 
while manipulating the levels of attention available to the afterim-
age inducer. The conscious visibility of the inducer stimulus was 
manipulated independently of attention by means of continuous 
flash suppression, a form of inter-ocular suppression (i.e., present-
ing a very salient object in one eye that completely suppresses the 
afterimage inducer in the other eye (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005, see 
also Gilroy and Blake, 2005; Tsuchiya et al., 2006). With the sup-
pression present, the Gabor patch inducing the afterimage was not 
perceived. This 2 × 2 design allowed for a full-factorial comparison 
(i.e., high attention/visible, low attention/visible, high attention/
invisible, and low attention/invisible).
van Boxtel et al. (2010) found that attention decreased the dura-
tion of the afterimage while awareness increased the duration of 
the afterimage. In other words: the effects of attention and aware-
ness opposed each other at the level of perception (see Figure 3D). 
There was no interaction between the effects of attention and 
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conclusIon
Here, we reviewed additional evidence for a dissociation between 
top-down, selective attention and consciousness. We find that there 
exists considerable evidence for attentional deployment without 
consciousness, supporting the view that attention is not sufficient 
for consciousness. We also reviewed evidence for consciousness 
without attention, which indicates that attention is not necessary 
for consciousness. Yet many scholars find the evidence for this lat-
ter claim insufficiently compelling. We believe that psychophysical 
studies are not powerful enough to decide this question. In particu-
lar, it may never be possible to fully prevent subjects paying some 
attention to a stimulus on the basis of purely behavioral techniques. 
Currently, many assume that an important means by which top-
down attention influence sensory processing is via cortico-cortical 
feedback connections (Macknik and Martinez-Conde, 2007). It 
may be possible to transiently, delicately, reversibly and specifically 
knock out all top-down cortico-cortical pathways, thereby prevent-
ing the subject, most likely a mouse or non-human primate, from 
exerting any sort of top-down attentional control. This could be 
achieved via molecular-biology tools, in particular opto-genetics 
(Han et al., 2009; Gradinaru et al., 2010). Unbraiding the complex 
relationship between attention and consciousness will ultimately 
depend on such powerful, interventionist tools.
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stream for action. In fact, the “pre-motor” theory of attention 
(Rizzolatti et al., 1987) argues that visual attention evolved from 
the need to plan to move the eyes to one location. Overt eye move-
ments and covert attention are closely related in both neural and 
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